

Patrick W. Schmitz

# Essays on the Economic Theory of Contracts and Incentives

Organizational Design, Adverse  
Selection, and Contractual Freedom

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and Contractual Freedom

Patrick W. Schmitz



Berichte aus der Volkswirtschaft

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# Contents

<b>0</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>I</b>	<b>Organizational Design</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>Control and Sequential Hidden Actions</b>	<b>17</b>
1.1	Introduction . . . . .	17
1.2	The basic model . . . . .	23
1.3	Separation versus integration . . . . .	25
1.4	Conditional control . . . . .	30
1.5	Modifications and extensions . . . . .	32
1.5.1	Different costs . . . . .	32
1.5.2	Renegotiation . . . . .	33
1.6	Concluding remarks . . . . .	36
1.7	Appendix . . . . .	39
<b>2</b>	<b>Joint Public-Private Ownership</b>	<b>49</b>
2.1	Introduction . . . . .	49
2.2	The basic model . . . . .	53
2.3	Scenario I: One-sided investment . . . . .	58
2.4	Scenario II: Two-sided investment . . . . .	61
2.5	A simple example . . . . .	65
2.6	Conclusion . . . . .	67

<b>II Adverse Selection</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>3 Verifiable Ex Post Information</b>	<b>71</b>
3.1 Introduction . . . . .	71
3.2 The Model . . . . .	77
3.3 Optimal contracts with a verifiable signal . . . . .	80
3.4 Conclusion . . . . .	90
3.5 Appendix . . . . .	93
<b>4 Licensing under Asymmetric Information</b>	<b>99</b>
4.1 Introduction . . . . .	99
4.2 The model . . . . .	103
4.3 Private information . . . . .	106
4.4 Conclusion . . . . .	110
4.5 Appendix . . . . .	112
<b>5 Auctions and Imperfect Competition</b>	<b>113</b>
5.1 Introduction . . . . .	113
5.2 The model . . . . .	115
5.3 An application . . . . .	120
5.4 Conclusion . . . . .	122
5.5 Appendix . . . . .	123
<b>III Contractual Freedom</b>	<b>125</b>
<b>6 Non-Renegotiation Clauses</b>	<b>127</b>
6.1 Introduction . . . . .	127
6.2 The basic model . . . . .	130
6.3 Scenario I: Commitment . . . . .	132
6.4 Scenario II: Renegotiation . . . . .	134
6.5 Should non-renegotiation terms be enforced? . . . . .	137

<i>CONTENTS</i>	5
6.6 Conclusion . . . . .	139
6.7 Appendix . . . . .	141
<b>7 Workplace Privacy Protection</b>	<b>147</b>
7.1 Introduction . . . . .	147
7.2 The basic model . . . . .	150
7.3 Scenario I: No privacy protection . . . . .	152
7.4 Scenario II: Privacy protection . . . . .	154
7.5 Concluding remarks . . . . .	155
<b>8 Job Protection and Agency Problems</b>	<b>157</b>
8.1 Introduction . . . . .	157
8.2 Job protection: Stylized facts and literature . . . . .	160
8.3 The basic model . . . . .	163
8.4 Symmetric information . . . . .	165
8.5 Asymmetric information . . . . .	166
8.6 Discussion . . . . .	174
8.7 Concluding remarks . . . . .	180
8.8 Appendix . . . . .	182
<b>References</b>	<b>185</b>